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RESUMO 
 
Ao longo dos últimos anos, as empresas multinacionais têm vindo a interpretar os preços de 
transferência como um aspeto crítico das suas políticas de gestão e eficiência fiscal. Neste 
contexto, o presente estudo tem como objetivo identificar/examinar os efeitos de financiamentos 
intra-grupo (com recursos a instrumentos derivados) sobre a agressividade de preços de 
transferência. Com base numa amostra seletiva de 117 empresas multinacionais cotadas no Reino 
Unido, para um período compreendido entre 2006 e 2014 (1053 observações empresas-ano), o 
modelo indica que os instrumentos financeiros derivados encontram-se significativamente 
associados a comportamentos de preços de transferência de índole agressiva. Mais 
concretamente, a volatilidade das taxas de juros e de câmbio contribuem de forma significativa 
para a ampliação da agressividade de preços de transferência internacional. Adicionalmente, a 
multinacionalidade das empresas também apresentam um impacto significativo sobre governação 
fiscal das entidades no âmbito do cumprimento fiscal em matéria de preços de transferência. O 
estudo empírico, de uma forma geral, apresenta resultados razoáveis, reforçados por testes de 
robustez, assim como por uma análise adicional que utiliza diferentes taxas efetivas de imposto 
(effective tax rate – ETR’s). 
 
Palavras-chave: Preços de transferência, Instrumentos Derivados, Multinacionalidade, 
Agressividade e Evasão Fiscal  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have long taking consideration into transfer pricing as a 
critical aspect of their tax management policies. The present study aims to identify the influence 
of intra-group financing using derivatives instruments on transfer pricing aggressiveness. Based 
on a selective sample of 117 publicly listed U.K. multinational enterprises over 2006 and 2014 
(1053 firms years observations), the regression model indicates derivatives to be significantly 
associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness behaviors. More specifically, interest rates and 
foreign exchange rates volatility have a positive contribution on magnifying international transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. Additionally, the multinationality of MNCs also exhibits a significant 
impact on entities tax governance. The overall empirical findings present reasonable results 
augmented by an additional analysis with recourse to effective tax measures.  
 
Keywords: Transfer Pricing, Derivative Instruments, Multinationality, Aggressiveness and 
Tax Avoidance
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays the use of financial derivative instruments is the foremost reason for corporate 
tax noncompliance practiced by MNCs to avoid or evade tax obligations. (United States 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011), (Organization for Economic Co-
Operation [OECD], 2010), and (HM Revenue & Customs [HMRC], 2016). Tax experts 
have identified the ease which derivatives can be restructured to allow taxpayers to take 
advantages of country tax rules on financial derivatives (GAO, 2011). 
Under this context, governmental departments such as, the HRMC and the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGA) claim the transfer 
pricing legislation addressing derivatives instruments to be on the top of the priorities on 
the international tax enforcement challenge for governmental tax offices. Moreover, a 
recent survey demonstrates that tax authorities are continuing to increase their transfer 
pricing resources, which in turn are leading to a general increase in the number of inquiries 
and audits. No individual tax authority surveyed has reduced its resources over the last two 
years (Ernst & Young, 2014). This increased scrutiny from tax departments have resulted in 
many court cases on aggressive transfer pricing arrangements carried out by well-known 
MNCs (i.e., Shell, Starbucks, Apple Inc.) showing the provision of substantial tax benefits 
and advantages that these MNCs take over the law, tax rates differences between 
jurisdictions, and the non-arm’s length principle of services, goods and funds transferred 
amongst the intra-group companies (Levin, 2012).  
Another important factor contributing for such scenarios relates the financial crisis and 
credit restriction from external lenders which increased the flow and dimension of 
intragroup financing throughout the application of derivatives, loans, guarantees and hybrid 
instruments arrangements (Van der Breggen, 2007). Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), call up 
attention for offshore financial centers, strategically set up for ease the flow of capital 
amongst different tax jurisdictions and finance business activities that are intensely driven 
by the cost of capital. Moreover, Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and Gravelle (2013), stated 
about the incorporation of MNCs treasuries in favorable tax jurisdictions which likely 
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increases the flow of capital amongst MNCs associates and still manages to comply with 
narrowed regulation and enforcements procedures about information disclosure on capital 
management requirements.  An economic analysis presented by the GAO detected that 34% 
and 24% of overseas and U.S.A. controlled companies, respectively, have reported no tax 
liabilities over the period of 1998-2005, where the major explanation for such evidence 
relates for the abuse of transfer pricing rules. (GAO, 2011).  
In order to attempt these inconsistences, as well as, to further assist MNCs and tax 
authorities with the compliance of the arm’s length principle1, the OECD has developed a 
number of extensive guidelines that are at the core of the modern transfer pricing regulation 
in the most of the developed nations. The latest OECD initiative, the so called Based 
Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS), published in October 2015, attempts to ensure that transfer 
pricing rules are not misused and the results are accordingly aligned with value creation. 
For example, George Osborne upon the delivery of his budget for 2016 announced the first 
introduction of BEPS measures to be implemented in the U.K. from 2017, where the 
estimation is to raise about £1.3 billion a year by limiting tax deductions for interest and 
finance costs. 
Despite some academic studies (Richardson and Taylor, 2015; Donohoe, 2015; 
Hanlon and Heitzam, 2010; and Taylor et al., 2015) and governmental reports (GAO, 2011; 
HMRC, 2013, HASGA, 2012) make clear that derivatives practices have an impact on tax 
avoidance, none of these, from the best of my knowledge, have looked closely how the 
association between financial derivatives and transfer pricing aggressiveness is determined. 
Under this context, this study aims to evaluate how derivative instruments, frequently used 
for hedging practices, determine the level of transfer pricing aggressiveness for publicly 
                                                 
1 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines makes reference in section B.1 to the arm’s length principle as: 
[Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their commercial or 
financial relations which h differ from those which  would be made between independent enterprises, then  
any profits which would, but for those conditions,  have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason  of 
those conditions, have not so accrued, may be  included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed  
accordingly.  
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listed multinational companies in the United Kingdom, bearing in mind these companies 
can get into favorable market conditions agreements which allows a reduction on their 
corporate tax liabilities.  
This study main contribution concerns the development of a transfer pricing aggressiveness 
dependent variable which comprises, simultaneously, the HRMC transfer pricing risk 
assessment regulation and thin capitalization rules. According to Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010), past transfer pricing indexes tend to consider inappropriate measurement 
rules, which may distort the overall research. By having this into consideration, the present 
study adds to modern literature an alternative, appropriate and effective measure of transfer 
pricing by providing both conceptual and methodological improvement and developing a 
case for the measurement of thin capitalization rules and transfer pricing aggressiveness for 
British incorporated multinational enterprises. Since the United Kingdom does not practice 
“safe harbors” 2 measures, the development of this proxy becomes more relevant, once it 
assures reliability and comparability on determining the allowed interest deduction 
according to the arm’s length principle stated by the OECD.  
Secondly, this research contributes to the extent of important literature on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness and tax avoidance (Taylor et al., 2015; Richardson and Taylor, 2015; and 
Taylor and Richardson, 2011; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; and Donohoe, 2015). Further to 
prior studies that identified intangibles and tax havens to have a significant impact on 
transfer pricing aggressiveness and tax avoidance, this study, sizes and complements such 
research articles by identifying how derivatives instruments (includes exposures to interest 
rate and foreign exchange rate) promote tax aggressive behaviors from the transfer pricing 
perspective.   
  
                                                 
2 The HRMC dismisses the idea of having ‘safe harbors’ ratios as this measure offers a simplistic method of 
determining tax consequences by reference to publicly-stated formulae, rather than by a precise application of 
the OECD principles. 
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Thirdly, and from the conceptual and methodological perspective this research paper 
includes important recommendations, practices and methodologies suggested by the most 
recent literature issued by OECD/G20 on Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest 
Deductions and Other Financial Payments, 2015, (BEPS: action 4), which from the best of 
my knowledge have been scarcely applied and considered in most recent transfer pricing 
scientific papers.  
Fourthly, this study decentralizes the majority of the scientific researches being developed 
under the transfer pricing umbrella of the United States of America and Australia, and 
comprises a sample of multinational companies publicly listed in the London Stock 
Exchange, which allows investors, researches and student community in general to have a 
broader perspective and an additional comparable factor on how European multinational 
entities, more specifically in the U.K., (i) comply with the OECD transfer pricing 
legislation, and (ii) structure their capital intensity.   
The structure of this research study is organized in the following manner, section 2 
examines the background literature on transfer pricing aggressiveness, financial derivative 
instruments and risk management strategies combining both concepts (transfer pricing and 
derivatives), section 3 develops the hypotheses, section 4 explores the research design and 
presents the base regression model, section 5 reports the empirical results, as well as, 
identifies robustness checks on the model and develops additional analysis on the 
dependent variable, section 6 concludes. 
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2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE  
The Transfer Pricing regulation in the United Kingdom has well established procedures and 
was intentionally developed to be consistent with the OECD Guidelines practices. Over the 
past year, the UK Transfer Pricing rules/guidance have remained unchanged, although the 
recent reports published by the OECD regarding the BEPS actions plans have caught the 
UK Government attention for a reflexive position on tackling aggressive tax planning 
strategies in the global economy.  
2.1 Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness Background 
The most of the OECD countries have harmonized Transfer Pricing regulation which is 
designed to assure that prices in operations taken by related parties have the appropriate 
allocation of profits across jurisdictions (Joint Committee on Taxation [JCT], 2010). 
However, the UK considers the current transfer pricing legislation to simplify the allocation 
of certain level of profits to low-tax jurisdictions in an inappropriate manner.  
Under the international context the perception of transfer pricing aggressiveness refers to 
the downward management of tax paid by transferring profits or losses amongst group 
associates incorporated in different tax jurisdictions through deliberate manipulation of 
intercompany transfer prices. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), present different ways of 
profits shifting, such as the financing of new subsidiaries in high tax jurisdictions with debt 
instead equity.  Furthermore, transfer pricing aggressiveness can be characterized by the 
raise of tax benefits for MNCs, as a whole, resulting from mispricing of services, products, 
interest, loan, and royalties among related parties. It thus considers transfer pricing 
behaviors falling into the gray area of tax compliance, as well as, activities that are clearly 
illegal (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
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Eden and Smith (2011), considers the transfer pricing aggressiveness to be a tax or 
financial advantage successfully taken by MNCs resulting from financial, economic or 
legislative arbitrage differences between jurisdictions. On the top of these jurisdictions are 
tax havens, which according to Drucker (2011)
3
 represented to be a common denominator 
presented on the largest tax audits undertaken or completed in the U.S.A., concerning 
transfer pricing aggressive operations.  
Usmen (2012) and the OECD (2013) public consultation draft on Transfer Pricing 
Risk Assessment argues that the use of tax havens jurisdictions by MNCs does not have in 
mind only its transfer pricing aggressive strategies, additionally it aims to engage in 
financial arbitrage procedures in order to manage their foreign currency cash flows as well 
as regulatory risk exposure.  
Levin (2012) compares the profits to be artificially inflated in low tax jurisdictions and 
deflated in high tax jurisdictions as a result of aggressive transfer pricing techniques carried 
out by related parties with no consideration of the arm’s length principle. The author further 
states that transfer pricing aggressiveness infers from the lack of assurance, with particular 
relevance for the arm’s length nature on intercompany prices of goods or services, transfer 
funds (i.e., dividends, royalties, interest), and the all methodology on the application of the 
appropriate transfer pricing method. 
2.2 Financial Derivatives Instruments Background 
A financial instrument or derivative is the result of any contractual terms agreed by at least 
two parties giving rise to financial asset of one entity and financial liability or equity 
instruments of another entity. In other words, a derivative instrument can be defined as a 
                                                 
3 Please see the “double Irish Dutch Sandwish” for evidence on these transfer pricing activities resulting from 
arrangements of U.S.A. groups (Facebook and Google) where the tax haven incorporated subsidiary plays an 
important role on the group structure (Drucker, 2011; Smyth, 2013). 
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contract which its value derives from its relation with something else, commonly referred 
as the “underlying” (Stulz, 2004).  
The underlying term under a derivative contract can be almost anything, however very 
often this is identified as other financial instrument or economic good.
4 
 
Bodnar et al., (2003) and Bartram et al., (2009), considers the uses of derivatives by MNCs 
to be often motivated by the insulation effect that it provides to earnings and cash flow risk 
exposure resulting from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates and commodity 
prices. Such example is given on Maynard (2008), which refers to Southwest Airlines as a 
well-known enterprise for using derivatives instruments to lock in jet fuel prices. Despite 
this common use of derivatives, MNCs very frequently adopt derivatives strategies for 
many other reasons, such as tax avoidance (Donohoe, 2015), earnings management 
(Barton, 2001), financial distress mitigation (Mayers and Smith, 1982), amongst others. 
Another important element to take into account under the financial derivate instruments 
practices relates to its accounting standards and MNCs reporting measurements. According 
to the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB, 2016), a worldwide institution 
responsible for the monitoring and standardize of financial accounting policies, derivatives 
instruments held for trading purposes shall be measured at their fair value in the balance 
sheet, while the unrealized holding gain/loss should be recognized in the statement of 
comprehensive income. On other hand, derivatives held for hedging purposes, should be 
measured at the fair value in the financial statement, while the unrealized holding gain/loss 
available for hedging strategies (including those classified as current assets) should not be 
considered in the earnings, instead it should be reported in other comprehensive income 
until realized. 
                                                 
4 In the majority of the times derivatives tend to follow three kinds of instruments: (i) options, (ii) futures and 
forwards, and (iii) swaps. Options involve the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying at a set 
price within a specified period. A futures or forward contract involves an obligation to exchange an 
underlying at a future date for a specific price, and swaps are agreements to exchange a stream of payments 
based on an underlying over a predefined period. 
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2.3 Risk Management Background 
After the financial downturn in 2007/2008 the global economy, in overall, has focused its 
attention on how MNCs can more effectively increase their management policies for risk 
exposures reduction. On the top priorities of governments and tax authorities is transfer 
pricing risk, which according to Borkowski and Gaffney (2014) have increased as more tax 
authorities worldwide implement or strengthen transfer pricing regulations and impose 
harsher penalties for infractions. 
In this context, managers and CEOs’ of multinational enterprises have put into practice 
innovative forms of risk management tools, such as enterprise risk management practices 
(ERM), which allows MNCs to identify specific risks exposures on their industry and 
economic environment, as well as, implement on time strategies to manage and reduce any 
form of external or uncontrollable management risk. 
On other hand, many of theories being published nowadays regarding risk management 
strategies suggest that hedging activities are becoming the most common practice of 
manage short term risk. In addition, some of those theories, for instance, Froot et al. (1993), 
highlight the cost of external financial borrow as the main aspect to put into practice a 
decent plan for hedging any volatility in foreign exchange volatility. Moreover, the authors 
further states that, if the cost of financing abroad is likely to be higher than internal 
financing, the recourse to hedging activities can represent an extreme value added benefit 
for MNCs, especially if it matches fund inflows with outflows, which consequently allows 
for lowering the chances that an MNC needs to access capital markets. 
Additionally, Smith and Stulz (1985), claim attention for the probability of potential tax 
motivations to hedge the volatility of cash flows and income. Furtherly, the author’s present 
evidence on the reduction of taxes for MNCs with a U-shaped tax function as a result of an 
effective monitoring and reduction in taxable income volatility. In addition, Stulz (1996) 
and Leland (1998) call up researcher’s attention for the reduction in cash-flow volatility 
through hedging to potentially increase debt capacity and produce greater tax advantages 
for MNCs.  
 10 
 
3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section considers the development of hypotheses regarding the impact of derivatives 
instruments and multinationality on MNCs transfer pricing aggressiveness. According to 
important literature, as previously presented, these variables argued to be relevant on the 
transfer pricing aggressiveness behaviors. 
3.1 Financial Derivatives 
The question to be imposed from this study perspective is “Why derivatives are so valuable 
for corporate tax aggressiveness?  
In the spotlight for derivatives practices nowadays is MNCs tax avoidance (JCT, 2011), in 
other words, the reduction of their tax liability. According to Lisowsky et al., (2013), and 
from a wide perspective, tax avoidance represents the continuum use of planned tax 
strategies to extremely and aggressively avoid tax responsibilities. Some of the literature 
addressing this subject,  in one hand, documents tax aggressiveness to be the result of 
hedging strategies (byproduct perspective), while the other hand, reports the ambiguity in 
derivative taxation to be at the forefront for tax aggressiveness behaviors (tax law literature 
perspective). The figure below addresses both perspectives (byproduct vs tax law 
literature) by describing the useful of derivatives for corporate tax aggressiveness. 
Table 1 - The valuable usage of derivatives for MNCs tax aggressiveness 
The complexity of derivatives instruments and transactions 
Byproduct  Tax Law  
 
Hedge Fundamentals 
Hedging risk reduces taxable income volatility, which 
allows MNCs to lower its expected tax expense 
(Simth and Stulz 1985). 
 
Ambiguity in Derivatives Taxation 
The ambiguity on derivatives taxation procedures 
allows MNCs to harmonize the timing and source 
of taxable income/deduction via transactional form 
and tax reporting choices. Some of these behaviors 
are legally valid, while others push the envelope of 
tax law. 
Adapted from Donohoe (2014) 
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Hedge Fundamentals 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), risk management strategies developed by 
MNCs do not increase their value in perfect capital markets. On the other hand of the 
spectrum, Aretz and Bartram (2010), explained why imperfections presented in the market, 
such as taxes, drive MNCs to a devoted allocation of resources, in order to reduce their 
financial risk. The main characteristic of a derivative instrument relates to his aptitude to 
reduce risk exposure. Thus, bearing in mind that the most tax legislations across OECD 
countries are relatively harmonized, successful hedge positions able MNCs to reduce the 
volatility risk of their taxable income (Keyes, 2008). Additionally, Froot et al., (1993) 
identified the cost of external financing to be more costly when compared to intra-group 
financing, which predicts that hedging practices represent a fair solution and a value-
increasing activity if it matches the inflow and outflow of funds, and consequently lowers 
the probability of MNCs needs to access capital markets. At the same hand, 
Smith and Stulz (1985) stated that cash flows and earnings stability via an accurate 
monitoring for volatility constitutes an extra motivation for hedging activities.  
Ambiguity in Derivatives Taxation 
The transactional form reflects tax aggressiveness to be closely attributable to ambiguity in 
derivative transactions, mainly concerning (i) fragmented reporting treatments rules, (ii) 
provision of minimal guidance for determine accurate tax treatments on complex 
instruments, Weisbach (2005) and, (iii) the complexity of derivatives represents another 
advantage for MNCs, once, finance and economist professionals, in somehow, may 
struggle to accurately interpret derivatives, then considering the ambiguous derivative 
taxation treatments, it is not surprising the tax authorities to struggle as well (Raghavan 
2007, 2008).   
In conclusion, if derivatives instruments represent an important factor of risk management 
strategies as stated in the literature above, any prospective changes in multinational 
enterprises derivatives portfolio position may be economically significant when compared 
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to potential hedging objectives such as, MNCs underlying risk exposure. Under this 
context, the present study estimates the exposure of MNCs market values to interest rates 
and currency exchange rates and the extent to which MNCs derivatives instruments 
potentially aim to hedge these exposures. By this means, the exposure is measured by 
estimating the effects of interest rate and exchange rates using exposure coefficients from 
MNCs monthly stock returns regression on changes in interest rates and exchange rates. To 
assess market exposure, the study assumes derivatives contracts to be held by the holding 
company (MNC) which subsequently serves its controlled companies according to the 
intragroup financing policies. Thus MNCs with significant exposure to interest rates and 
exchange rates have higher market value sensibility which subsequently increases their 
likelihood for aggressive transfer pricing behaviors. 
H1: All else remaining constant, derivatives instruments practices are significantly 
associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness.  
3.2 Multinationality  
Nowadays the success of MNCs international globalization and market diversification axes 
on the parent company abilities to manage and monitor the wider spectrum of economic, 
cultural and political risks across countries. As a result of these events, it is not surprising 
for MNCs to developed complex organizational structures that very frequently lack for 
transparency.  
Jacob’s (1996), one of the first transfer pricing studies, examined that MNCs sited in 
different tax jurisdictions have greater tax opportunities and resources not only to shift 
income (i.e., royalty income, interest and dividend) to favorable tax jurisdictions, but as 
well to assign important allowable tax expenses (for instance, debt interest paid) to high tax 
jurisdictions.  
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At the same hand, various research papers (Clausing, 2009; and Klassen and Laplante, 
2012a) reported the existence of income shifting, as well as, predicted the high possibility 
of income shifting between related party companies located in different tax jurisdictions, to 
be preferably developed via (i) strategic debt location, (ii) transfer pricing transactions and 
(iii) preferential cost allocation. 
Rego (2003) and Dyreng et al. (2008) concluded that MNCs tend to be more capable and 
have higher chances to reduce their corporate tax liability when compared against those 
corporations operating purely in the internal market. The author’s further identified that 
MNCs relying intensively in foreign transactions or deriving higher income from external 
sources have greater reasons and scope to engage in income shifting behaviors.  
Desai et al., (2006a) further concluded that higher international MNCs exposure, extensive 
intercompany operations and greater R&D expenditure, preferred the use of tax haven 
vehicles to avoid their liabilities. The authors additionally found that MNCs effective tax 
rates (ETRs) usually reflect a combination of transactions in either higher or lower tax 
regimes which reflects this way their aggressiveness in exploring tax havens jurisdictions to 
support their income shifting schemes. 
H2: All else remaining constant, the multinationality of MNCs is significantly 
associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness.  
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Data selection and sample design 
The present study considers the largest 200 stock enterprises (highest stock capitalization) 
publicly listed at the London Stock Exchange for the period of 2006-2014. I have focused 
on the largest stocks enterprises because previous studies (Nance et al., 1993; Graham and 
Rogers, 2002; and Hentschel and Kothari, 2001) have provided strong evidence that large 
enterprises are more likely to incur in derivative instruments contracts, as well as, the 
largest 200 enterprises economically represent a significant fraction of the portfolio value 
of the U.K. market stock capitalization. In this context, the sample size was reduced to 117 
enterprises, after exclude, (i) enterprises falling into finance and insurance sector (section 
K – three digit UK SIC codes 641-663), (ii) enterprises operating in the electricity, gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply (section D – three digit UK SIC codes 351-353), (iii) 
firms with activities in water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities (section E – three digit UK SIC codes 360-390), (iv) enterprises with no overseas 
subsidiaries, (v) corporations exempt from transfer pricing rules, this is classified as 
small/medium sized enterprises
5
, and (vi) multinational enterprises with no derivatives 
instruments in their annual reports from 2006 to 2014. Regarding the enterprises falling 
into a specific industry category (K, D and E), their exclusion concerns not only the 
significant differences in accounting policies and derivation in accounting estimates, 
additionally, it considers particularities in legislation and regulatory constraints on 
reporting which certain industries, e.g., utilities, are subject for. The full sample consists in 
1053 firm-year observations over the period of 9 years. Financial information was obtained 
from recognized database sources such as, Amadeus from Bureau Van Dijk and Eikon 
Datastream from Thomson Reuters.  
 
                                                 
5 The HRMC, based on the European Commission (2003/361/EC), defines micro, small and medium sized 
enterprises as “an entity that qualifies as either small or medium if it meets the staff headcount ceiling (less 
than 250 employees) for that class and one (or both) of the financial limits (annual turnover less than €50 
million and/or balance sheet less than €43 million). Where the entity is a member of a group, or has an 
associated entity, these limits apply to the whole group and not the specific entity”. 
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The following table presents the criteria’s adopted on the exclusion of some enterprises 
sectors in the study sample. 
Table 2 - Sample descriptive criteria’s 
Description Selection/Exclusion criteria 
London Stock Exchange 200
th
  largest Stock Capitalized Enterprises; 
Time Period 2006-2014; 
Type of accounts Consolidated accounts only; 
Sector Industry 
Sectors excluded: 
 financial and insurance (section K – three 
digit UK SIC codes 641-663); 
 electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply (section D – three digit UK SIC codes 
351-353); 
 water supply, sewerage, waste management 
and remediation activities (section E – three 
digit UK SIC codes 360-390). 
Other reason for exclusion 
 enterprises with no overseas subsidiaries; 
 corporations exempt from transfer pricing 
rules, this is classified as small/medium sized 
enterprises; and, 
 multinational enterprises with no derivatives 
instruments in their annual reports from 2006 
to 2014. 
Final Set (firms) 117 multinational enterprises 
Final Set observations (firms-year) 1053 firm-years observations 
4.2 Dependent variable 
The BEPS (2015) initiatives and the OECD thin capitalization legislation (2012) defines 
the profit shifting through interest as one of the preferred practices used by MNCs to 
structure their financing arrangements and maximize their tax benefits (increased deduction 
in interest paid and reduction in taxable profit, consequently). The U.K. thin-capitalization 
and intra-group funding legislation
6
 defines the procedures which enterprises shall follow 
                                                 
6 The thin-capitalization and intra-group funding legislation is considered in the Act 2010 (TIOPA10), 
previously in Schedule 28AA ICTA 1988, commits HMRC to interpreting transfer-pricing transactions in 
accordance with the principles set down by the OECD. This commitment centers on Article 9 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The legislation, applies the arm’s length 
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when assessing the maximum interest-bearing debt that can give rise for interest deductions 
for each tax year. Specifically, the section INTM 515010 of HRMC internal manual, 
defines that covenants
7
 applied at intervals allows for identification of whether or not the 
enterprises maintain the ability to service and repay the borrowing debt. The breach of this 
terms and conditions by the borrower usually triggers attention from the lender and signals 
for an aggressive tax behavior, and perhaps avoidance.  
Since the U.K does not operate “safe harbors”8, the British tax legislation applies the 
OECD guidance by taking debt and earnings ratios as the appropriate measure of the arm’s 
length principle to calculate the allowed interest deduction. Based on the conceptual thin 
capitalization approach
9
 presented in Richardson and Taylor (2015), the present study 
contributes for the extent transfer pricing literature by developing a new proxy measure 
based on the disallowed interest expense defined by the British tax authorities’, i.e., the 
HRMC thin capitalization manual for U.K. entities
10
. Since the U.K. legislation does not 
applied static thin capitalization measures, in other words, “safe harbors”, the development 
of this new transfer pricing proxy presents relevance and a unique contribution for the 
transfer pricing literature, since it addresses complexity and accuracy on defining a more 
reliable arm’s length principle. 
To determine whether a MNC uses excessive interest deduction, the dependent variable 
was measured through the ratios EBITDA/interest paid and debt/EBITDA, and thereafter 
matched against a benchmarking inter-quartile range (IQR), specifically designed for each 
                                                                                                                                                    
principle to lending and borrowing transactions - treating parties to a transaction as if they were independent 
of each other. 
7 A loan covenant commonly includes a maximum ratio of debt to earnings and a minimum ratio of earnings 
to interest costs. The latter ratio is known as ‘interest cover’. Interest cover covenants are common in third 
party loan agreements and are a mainstay of thin capitalization agreements. Thus a borrower’s interest cover 
is a measure of its ability to service its debt - to pay the interest and other regular costs of borrowing - rather 
than of its ability to repay the principal. 
8 According to HMRC “a safe harbor in this context is a legislative limit on interest deduction by reference to 
fixed ratios, such as a debt:equity ratio of 3:1 applicable to all company funding.” 
9 The thin capitalization proxy developed in Richardson and Taylor (2015) considers the U.S tax legislation, 
as well as, all the terms and conditions framed in the US thin capitalization legislation, largely different from 
the U.K. framework.  
10 According to the HMRC the “interest cover covenants have been adopted for use in Advance Thin Cap 
Agreements to measure arm’s length interest for each year of the agreement. In the event of a breach of 
covenant, enough interest is disallowed to restore the ratio”. 
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UK Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code section. The transfer pricing 
aggressiveness variable (TPAGG) is measured as a dummy variable, code as 1 if a MNC 
EBITDA/interest paid is below its UK SIC benchmarking IQR or debt/EBITDA is above 
its UK SIC benchmarking IQR, and 0 otherwise.  
4.3 Independent variables 
The independent variables are comprised by financial derivatives instruments (FDI) and 
multinationality (MULTI). In order to gain additional clearance and perspective on firms 
risk management practices and transfer pricing aggressiveness, the present study extends 
and sizes the present transfer pricing literature by including the FDI variables as a measure 
for risk management incentive (hedging risk) that influences the use of financial derivatives 
instruments and consequently the transfer pricing aggressiveness. Thus, financial derivative 
instruments (FDI) is defined by two sub-variables, the interest rate (IR) which stands for 
entities with interest rates derivatives, and the foreign exchange rate (FER) which 
represents multinational enterprises with exchange rate derivatives. Both measures (IR and 
FER) represent the market value exposure to financial prices and aim to estimate accurately 
the transfer pricing aptitudes for aggressive behaviors. 
Having this into context, the IR variable is calculated as the estimated coefficient from a 
regression of a MNC monthly holding period stock returns on the monthly percentage 
change in the 6 months London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), (Guay, 1999; 
Zhang, 2009). 
The FER is measured as the foreign currency exchange rate, defined as the estimated 
coefficient from a regression monthly holding period stock returns on the monthly 
percentage change in the sterling ERI trade weighted index (Guay, 1999; Zhang, 2009). 
On other hand, the MULTI variable takes into consideration relevant literature findings 
from Harris et al., (1993), Rego (2003), Mills and Newberry (2004), which states that 
MNCs with a substantial number of foreign business subsidiaries are likely to behave more 
aggressively than MNCs operating domestically. By having this results into context the 
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MULTI is calculated as a dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms reporting current or 
deferred foreign income taxes, and 0 otherwise. 
4.4 Control variables 
The control variables included in the present study are represented by profitability 
(PROFIT), MNCs size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), cash flow from operating activities 
(CFOA), year effects (YEAR) and industry (INDS).  
According to Jacob (1996), profitable (PROFIT) MNCs have greater reasons to engage in 
aggressive transfer pricing behaviors to finally avoid significant corporate taxes. Nowadays 
many MNCs, for instance, Microsoft, Google and Apple, have been able to practice 
aggressive tax strategies by favorably locating their profits in low tax jurisdictions and 
increase their taxable deductible expenditure in high tax jurisdictions in order to 
significantly reduce their taxable profits (Duhigg et al., 2012; Womack et al., 2011; Mutti 
et al., 2009). The PROFIT control variable is measured via pretax income divided by total 
assets as defined in Gupta and Newberry (1997).  
The size variable (SIZE) takes into consideration both resources and incentives that MNCs 
have in hand to efficiently apply planned and aggressive transfer pricing behaviors across 
the group subsidiaries. MNCs with multiple foreign entities have greater opportunities to 
exploit tax legislations in different countries which able them to plan tax strategies and shift 
income from high to low tax jurisdictions by locating their operations in these favorable 
locations (Slemrod, 2001; Rego, 2003). SIZE is measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets as presented in Stickney and McGee (1982).  
The leverage variable (LEV), according to Hines (1996), Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001), 
and Rego (2003), has a great potential to identify high leveraged MNCs exploiting tax 
deductions opportunities resulting from interest payments and loan fees and shifting debt 
amongst low tax jurisdictions. Additionally, many other studies on tax avoidance presented 
evidence on how MNCs with high debt to equity ratios tend to behave in a more aggressive 
manner than highly capitalized MNCs, Bernard et al., 2006, Dyreng et al., 2008, and Blouin 
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et al., 2013. The LEV control variable is measured according to Gupta and Newberry 
(1997), by dividing long term debt from the total assets.  
The CFOA variable will be considered in the regression model to control and monitor for 
the flow of funds occurring from operations and MNCs performances (Dechow et al., 
1998). Further, Hanlon (2005) states that some of the tax favorable jurisdictions, e.g., tax 
shelters, frequently provide information on the persistence of underlying cash flow streams 
and earning persistence of MNCs. At the same hand, Kim et al., 2011, presents evidence 
that CFOA has a significant association with tax avoidance. Under this context, the CFOA 
variable is measured by the cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets.  
On other hand, the industry (INDS) which MNCs operate is very likely to positively affect 
their transfer pricing aggressiveness behaviors, with certain sectors of activity offering 
greater propensity to this final end (Oyelere, 1998; Bernard et al., 2006). Thus, the INDS
11
 
control variable is defined as a dummy, coded as 1, as it controls for the UK Standard 
Industry Classification (UK SIC) sections, such as: (i) mining and quarrying (section B), 
(ii) manufacturing (section C), (iii) construction (section F), (iv) wholesale and retail trade 
(section G), (v) information and communication (section G), and (vi) professional scientific 
and technical services (section M).  
The YEAR variable controls for time fixed effects of any change, development or initiative 
in transfer pricing or linked legislation between the periods of 2006-2014. As a natural 
reaction, each of the years comprehended between 2006 and 2014 have had their own 
specificities, which directly or indirectly may influence MNCs to put into practice 
aggressive tax planning strategies and incentives. Thus, YEAR is classified as a dummy 
variable, coded as 1, if any specific year ranged between 2006 and 2014 have seen the 
introduction, development or change in transfer pricing or linked legislation, otherwise is 0.  
                                                 
11 Consistent with the HRMC (2014) “tax planning structures and arrangements which result in BEPS are 
generic and can be utilized by multinational groups in all sectors”. Thus, the UK Standard Industry 
Classification code (UK SIC) identified under the INDS variable considers the six most aggressive transfer 
pricing sectors as defined in the TPAGG variable (excludes transportation and storage). 
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4.5 Base Regression Model 
In order to verify the influence of financial derivatives practices (IR and FER) and 
multinationality (MULTI) on transfer pricing aggressiveness (TPAGG) behaviors, the 
present study considers a logistic regression model since the dependent variable is 
classified as a dichotomous variable, and the independent and control variables assume, 
simultaneously, quantitative and qualitative values in the model. According to Marôco 
(2014), this method provides the most effective way to identify and estimate the 
significance of the independent variables in the model, when compared to other statistical 
methods such as, for example, the discriminant analysis. The logistic regression model 
presents a broader field for application since (i) it accepts qualitative and quantitative 
predictors, (ii) does not assume the dependent variable and independent variables to be 
linear correlated, (iii) does not require the independent variables to be normal distributed, 
and (iv) is less sensitive to outliers.  
In this context, the logistic regression model is stated as follows: 
TPAGG*it = αit + β1 IRit + β2 FERit + β3 MULTIit + β4 PROFITit + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + 
β7 CFOAit + β8 INDSit + β9 YEARit + εit                                                                                                          (4.1)                                                                                                                                         
where, TPAGG*it, represents the latent variable associated to the observable variable, being 
TPAGG equal to 1 (one) when TPAGG* > 0, otherwise, TPAGG equals 0 (zero) when 
TPAGG* ≤ 0, additionally i = stands for each MNCs ranged from 1 to 117, and 
t = represents the financial period considered in present study ranging from 2006 to 2014, 
inclusive, ε stands for the error term. 
In order to clarify the base regression model (4.1), the following table provides a summary 
description on the measurement of the dependent, independent and controls variables in the 
study. 
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Table 3 - Variables Description 
Dependent Variable Description 
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness (TPAGG) 
Dummy variable, code as 1 if: 
 
 EBITDA/interest paid < UK SIC benchmarking 
IQR; or 
 Debt/EBITDA > UK SIC benchmarking IQR, 
0 otherwise.  
Independent Variables  
Financial Derivatives Instruments  
 Interest Rate Exposure (IR) 
IR: the estimated coefficient from a regression of a 
MNCs monthly holding period stock returns on the 
monthly percentage change in the 6M Libor. 
 Foreign Exchange Rate (FER) 
FER: the estimated coefficient from a regression of 
monthly holding period stock returns on the 
monthly percentage change in ERI trade weighted 
index. 
Multinationality (MULTI) 
MULTI: dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms 
reporting current or deferred foreign income taxes, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables  
Profitability (PROFIT)  PROFIT: Pretax income divided by total assets. 
Size (SIZE) SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage (LEV) LEV: long term debt divided the total assets. 
Cash Flow from Activities (CFOA) 
CFOA: cash flow from operating activities divided 
by total assets. 
Industry (INDUS) 
INDS: dummy variable, coded as 1, if the UK SIC 
sections equals: (i) mining and quarrying (section 
B), (ii) manufacturing (section C), (iii) construction 
(section F), (iv) wholesale and retail trade (section 
G), (v) information and communication (section G), 
and (vi) professional scientific and technical 
services (section M). 
Year (YEAR) 
YEAR: a dummy variable, coded as 1, if any specific 
year ranged between 2006 and 2014 have seen the 
introduction, development or change in transfer 
pricing or linked legislation, otherwise is 0. 
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4, present’s important descriptive statistics for the different variables considered in 
the present study, i.e., the dependent variable (TPAGG), independent variables (IR, FER, 
and MULTI) and the control variables (PROFIT, SIZE, LEV, CFOA, INDS, and YEAR).  
As the results show in table 4, the TPAGG mean (0,701) indicates that approximately 70% 
of MNCs are above the allowed interest deduction legibility for income tax purposes in the 
UK. On other hand, regarding the financial derivatives instruments, the IR mean (0,533) 
indicates that MNCs have, approximately, 53% of their market value of equity exposed to 
interest rate changes in financial markets. At the same time, despite the FER variable 
(0,014) present less sensitivity of MNCs (1,4%) market value exposure to exchange rates, 
is still reasonable to argue that there is a positive sign and motivation to risk-averse CEO’s 
and tax managers to reduce/mitigate the stock price exposure to volatile exchange rates and 
subsequently ease the volatility in MNCs stock base portfolio wealth. 
In addition, another important result links the incorporation of subsidiaries in abroad 
jurisdictions as shown by the MULTI variable mean (0,872). Representing about 87% of the 
MNCs in the sample, the MULTI indicates that at least 1 subsidiary runs a business in a 
non-domestic jurisdictions, which definitely increases the probability of tax aggressive 
behaviors of MNCs. 
Finally, the statistics presented for skewness and kurtosis allow to conclude a data set 
reasonably normally distributed. More specifically, from the skewness results we can verify 
that all variables, except the MULTI variable, present modest symmetry distribution to 
mean, as coefficients registered results close to 0, this is, between ] -0,5 and +0,5 [, as 
defined by Runyon et al. (1996, cited in Marôco, 2014, pp.22). Regarding the kurtosis, the 
overall distribution results coefficients remain within the range of ] -0,5 and +0,5 [, 
exception made to TPAGG, FER and MULTI  that show slightly higher values, indicating a 
sharper peak. Despite these higher kurtosis coefficients registered, Westfall (2014) argues 
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that higher kurtosis means more of the variance is the result of infrequent extreme 
deviations, as opposed to frequent modestly sized deviations.  
Table 4 - Descriptive statistics - Variables Summary 
Variable Summary 
Variables Mean STD.DEV Skewness Kurtosis 
TPAGG 0,701 0,458 -0,879 -1,230 
IR 0,533 1,790 0,396 0,634 
FER 0,014 6,337 -0,038 1,438 
MULTI 0,872 0,334 -2,227 2,967 
LEV 0,210 0,137 0,348 -0,414 
PROFIT 0,080 0,061 0,424 -0,114 
CFOA 0,098 0,060 0,318 -0,080 
SIZE 15,218 1,292 0,308 -0,171 
Valid N (listwise)                                                                     1053 
Table 5, reports industry summary descriptive statistics according to UK SIC codes. 
Considering the sample distribution (1053 firm-years), we verify that manufacturing 
industry counts with the greater fraction of MNCs included in the present study (25,641%), 
wholesale and retail trade counts with (14,530%), construction and information & 
communication (11,966%) and (10,256%), respectively. Professional, scientific and 
technical activities (9,402%) and mining and quarrying (7,692%) close the top six UK SIC 
codes industries with the highest contribution for the present sample data set. 
Moreover, table 5 reports descriptive statistics on MNCs with transfer pricing 
aggressiveness behaviors only, per UK SIC codes. Consistent with the observations in the 
sample distribution, the TPAGG per industry classification presents the manufacturing 
(22,493%), wholesale and retail trade (12,195%) and construction (11,653%) as the 
industries in the UK with the highest number of MNCs frequently concurring with 
disallowed interest expenses for tax purposes, according to HMRC thin capitalization rules. 
In addition, information & communication (10,705%), professional, scientific and technical 
activities (10,569%), and mining and quarrying (7,182%) follow the tendency, although 
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with less frequency. Standard deviation for the majority of the variables shows a central 
tendency with the median results. 
Table 5 - Descriptive statistics - Industry Summary 
Industry summary statistics  
UK Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) 
Codes 
Sample distribution TPAGG per industry classification 
No. of 
MNCs -Years 
Relative Frequency 
(%) 
No. of 
MNCs -Years 
Relative Frequency 
(%) 
Section B - Mining and 
Quarrying 
81 7,692% 53 7,182% 
Section C - Manufacturing 270 25,641% 166 22,493% 
Section F - Construction 126 11,966% 86 11,653% 
Section G - Wholesale and 
retail trade 
153 14,530% 90 12,195% 
Section H - Transportation 
and storage 
63 5,983% 61 8,266% 
Section I - 
Accommodation and food 
service activities 
36 3,419% 27 3,659% 
Section J - Information 
and communication 
108 10,256% 79 10,705% 
Section L - Real estate 
activities 
9 0,855% 5 0,678% 
Section M - Professional, 
scientific and technical 
activities 
99 9,402% 78 10,569% 
Section N - 
Administrative and 
support service activities 
54 5,128% 43 5,827% 
Section O - Public 
administration and 
defence; compulsory 
social security 
27 2,564% 24 3,252% 
Section R - Arts, 
entertainment and 
recreation 
18 1,709% 18 2,439% 
Section S - Other service 
activities 
9 0,855% 8 1,084% 
Total 1053 100% 738 100% 
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Another important set of results is shown in table 6, by comparing all the 315 
non-aggressive MNCs against 315 aggressive MNCs (includes 35 firms randomly picked 
for each period between 2006 and 2014). As we can verify, in average non-aggressive 
MNCs (0,630) are likely to present a slightly higher interest rate risk exposure (IR) when 
compared to aggressive MNCs (0,487) since non-aggressive MNCs behavior doesn’t 
assume the practice of hedging activities to mitigate their market value risk exposure. 
Identical results are presented in the FER variable.  
On other hand, the MULTI variable shows that aggressive MNCs (0,844) and 
non-aggressive MNCs (0,863) have similar structures concerning the number of foreign 
subsidiaries operating abroad. Further, consistent with Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001) and 
Rego (2003), the LEV variable also proves further evidence that aggressive MNCs (0,244) 
have great potential to exploiting tax deductions opportunities resulting from interest 
payments, loan fees and shifting debt amongst low tax jurisdictions when compared with 
non-aggressive MNCs (0,147). Overall results are in accordance with relevant literature 
presented above.   
Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics – Non -TPAGG vs TPAGG 
NON-TPAGG & TPAGG  
Variables  
Mean STD.DEV Skewness Kurtosis 
NON 
TPAGG 
TPAGG 
NON 
TPAGG 
TPAGG 
NON 
TPAGG 
TPAGG 
NON 
TPAGG 
TPAGG 
IR 0,630 0,487 1,948 1,705 -0,046 0,733 1,417 0,079 
FER 0,751 0,232 6,245 6,187 0,661 -0,178 1,166 0,907 
MULTI 0,863 0,844 0,344 0,363 -2,128 -1,910 2,543 1,658 
LEV 0,147 0,265 0,103 0,137 0,731 -0,008 0,519 -0,504 
PROFIT 0,103 0,068 0,060 0,056 0,092 0,747 -0,436 0,820 
CFOA 0,109 0,088 0,064 0,056 0,032 0,385 -0,376 0,322 
SIZE 15,141 15,286 1,372 1,277 0,573 0,143 -0,208 -0,134 
Total 630 
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5.2 Correlation results 
Table 7 summarizes the Spearman matrix results for the correlation coefficients. We find 
the presence of significant correlations between TPAGG and LEV, PROFIT, CFOA, at the 
1% level, and SIZE at the 5% level of significance. Additionally, the study finds TPAGG to 
have a negative association with IR (-0,045) and FER (-0,039), in other words, as the 
aggressiveness in TPAGG behaviors increases, the sensibility of MNCs market value of 
equity to interest rates and foreign exchange rates volatility tends to decrease. These types 
of multinationals frequently recur to hedging contracts in order to reduce the risk exposure 
of their subsidiaries, increasing this way their appetite for aggressive behaviors amongst the 
group transactions. Other important conclusion to be made from the Spearman matrix 
relates the significant association between TPAGG and LEV (0,312; P > 0,01), presenting 
further evidence on how MNCs with high debt to equity ratios tend to behave more 
aggressively compared to high capitalized MNCs.  
Further, significant association between TPAGG, PROFIT and CFOA at (-0,253; P > 0,01) 
and (-0,126; P > 0,01), respectively, comply with the great potential that MNCs have to 
explore tax opportunities in high tax jurisdictions in order to reduce their taxable profits in 
the home country. Multicollinearity between exogenous variables is moderate, representing 
mid-low levels, in fact the highest correlation coefficients occurred between PROFIT and 
CFOA (0,403; P > 0,01), which for the sake of the present study does not affect the 
legitimacy of the model results.  
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Table 7 - Spearman/Kendall's Matrix Correlation 
 
TPAGG IR FER MULTI LEV PROFIT CFOA SIZE 
TPAGG -   0,16     
IR - 0,045 -  0,000     
FER - 0,039 0,059 - 0,035     
MULTI - -  - -     
LEV 0,312*** 0,023 0,041 - 0,062** -    
PROFIT - 0,253*** - 0,017 0,002  - 0,025 -0,107*** -   
CFOA - 0,126*** 0,047 - 0,014    0,001  0,044 0,403*** -  
SIZE 0,067** 0,041 - 0,033  0,086*** 0,140*** - 0,077** -0,121*** - 
*** indicates significance at 0,01 level and ** indicates significance at  0,05 level.  
The p-values are 2-tailed, once it aims to test for the possibility of the relationship in both directions. 
5.3 Regression results 
The logistic regression results presented in table 8 shows the probability of the exogenous 
variables influence transfer pricing aggressiveness behaviors at different significance levels 
of association. The IR coefficient (X
2
Wald = 2,921; p = 0,087) shows significant evidence 
(p < 0,10) that exposure to interest rates volatility boosts aggressive transfer pricing 
behaviors to be adopted by MNCs, thus supports H1. Consistent with Guay et al., (2003) 
and Keyes (2008) equity value exposure to interest rate volatility increases the usage of 
hedging instruments by MNCs, which consequently reflects their appetite to incur in 
aggressive transfer pricing behaviors across group transactions. Regarding the FER 
coefficient (X
2
Wald = 7,725; p = 0,005), the results keep the IR variable tendency, this is, a 
significant coefficient at 1% level (p < 0,01), which fully supports H1. Consistent with 
Zhang (2009) and Donohoe (2015) foreign exchange risk exposure incurred by MNCs 
subsidiaries enhances the MNCs likelihood for tax aggressiveness, since the high volume of 
daily transactions in different currencies may result in a loss, economically significant for 
the firm financial results. 
On other hand, the MULTI variable coefficient (X
2
Wald = 1,883; p = 0,170) in the model 
presents a result slightly above the level of significance of 10%, which does not supports 
H2. Despite this result, is reasonable to say that multinational corporations are still likely to 
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behave aggressively from the transfer pricing perspective. In other words, as supported by 
other important research articles (Hanlon et al., 2007 and Rego, 2003), the greater the level 
of MNCs multinational operations the greater the likelihood of those MNCs incur in 
transfer pricing aggressiveness transactions. 
Regarding the control variables in the model, the coefficients results for LEV and PROFIT 
are significantly associated to aggressive transfer pricing behaviors at 1 % level. The LEV 
(X
2
Wald = 78,454; p = 0,000), and PROFIT (X
2
Wald = 28,056; p = 0,000), are statically 
significant at 1% level, which shows a strong linkage to transfer pricing aggressive 
behaviors as stated in Richardson and Taylor (2015) and Taylor et al., (2015). On other 
hand, regardless the CFOA variable does not present a statically significant result (X
2
Wald 
= 1,679; p = 0,195), seems appropriate to make reference for this variable significance due 
to its capacity to monitor the flow of funds to favorable tax jurisdictions (Dechow et al., 
1998; and Hanlon, 2005).   
Another important set of results to be considered in this study relates the odds ratio
12
 (OR) 
as given by Exp (B). The OR predicts the chances of non-aggressive (group 1) vs aggressive 
(group 2) transfer pricing behaviors occur given its exposure to each independent variable 
unit at a 95% confidence interval. As shown in table 8, the IR variable conditions 
(Exp (B) = 0,932 < 1) presents a lower probability to occur in non-aggressive MNCs 
compared to aggressive MNCs, whom frequently recur to derivative instruments to reduce 
their interest rate exposure. In addition, the results for FER and MULTI variables, 
(Exp (B) = 0,968 < 1) and (Exp (B) = 0,737 < 1), respectively, present similar results, in 
other words, the conditions imposed in these two variables are more likely to occur in 
aggressive transfer pricing MNCs when compared to non-transfer pricing aggressive 
MNCs. Regarding the control variables (PROFIT, CFOA and SIZE) the results remains 
                                                 
12 According to Szumilas (2010), “an odds ratio (OR) is a measure of association between an exposure and 
an outcome. The OR represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular exposure, compared to 
the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure. Odds ratios are most commonly used in 
case-control studies, however they can also be used in cross-sectional and cohort study designs as well (with 
some modifications and/or assumptions). An odds ratio of 1(one) indicates that the condition or event under 
study is likely to occur in both groups, at the same hand, a ratio greater than 1 (one) indicates the likelihood 
that the condition or event is more likely to occur in the first group. Finally, an odd ratio lesser than 1 (one) 
indicates that the probability is lower in the first group than in the second “. 
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consistent with the independent variables odds ratio predictions, exception made to LEV 
variable (Exp (B) = 267,658 > 1), which presents an OR above 1, indicating that leverage 
MNCs  have higher chances to occur in non-aggressive MNCs. The McFadden pseudo 
R
2
 (0,141) shows a reasonable result, consistent with Richardson and 
Taylor (2011 and 2015) and Taylor et al., (2015).  
To conclude, the overall regression indicates that MNCs have been employing aggressive 
behaviors from the transfer pricing perspective, given the significant coefficients obtained 
from the model. More specifically, MNCs with high market value exposure to interest rates 
and exchange rates tend to practice derivatives contracts to hedge intragroup volatility 
amongst controlled companies’ activities. Multinationality also presents empirical evidence 
that higher number of related parties spread across favorable debt locations enhances 
transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
Table 8 - Logistic regression results - TPAGG 
  B S.E. X
2 
Wald Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
IR -0,070 0,041 2,921* 0,932 0,860 1,010 
FER -0,032 0,012 7,725*** 0,968 0,947 0,991 
MULTI -0,305 0,222 1,883 0,737 0,477 1,140 
LEV 5,590 0,631 78,454*** 266,658 77,697 922,049 
PROFIT -6,965 1,315 28,056*** 0,001 0,000 0,012 
CFOA -1,744 1,346 1,679 0,175 0,013 2,445 
SIZE -0,020 0,059 0,119 0,980 0,873 1,100 
YEAR  Yes 
INDUS Yes 
Constant 0,583 0,937 0,386 1,791 - - 
Pseudo R
2
 
McFadden  
0,140 
N 1053 
*** indicates significance at the 0,01 level, ** indicates significance at  0,05 level and * indicates 
significance at the 0,10 level;  
The p-values are 2-tailed, once it aims to test for the possibility of the relationship in both directions. 
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5.4 Robustness checks 
In order to assess the regression model reliability and consistency, several robustness 
checks were performed to regression results in table 8. Firstly, it was executed a diagnostic 
to detect the presence of outliers and influent observations in the model, whereby a diagram 
for studentized residuals of the estimated probabilities and the analog of Cook’s influence 
statistics were performed. The results obtained, present a reduced number of outliers above 
the reference, i.e., |rj| > 2 (appendix 1), with no significant influence values over the 
regression coefficient. In addition, the analog of Cook’s influences presents a few 
observations above the reference value, i.e., DX2 > 4 (appendix 2)
 13
, however none of the 
Cook’s distance points are above 1, which denotes the absence of influent observations on 
the model coefficients.  
Secondly, it was developed an efficiency classification table which defines the sensibility 
and the specificity of the model. As shown in appendix 3, the model sensibility (0,897) 
classifies accurately in approximately 90% the MNCs with transfer pricing aggressiveness 
behaviors. Regarding the model specificity (0,286), it indicates that about 29% of MNCs 
securely present no transfer pricing aggressiveness behaviors. Globally, the model includes 
robust observations by properly classifying 71,4% firm-year observations, approximately.  
Thirdly, it was performed robustness checks in the regression model capacity to 
discriminate TP Aggressive MNCs vs TP Non-Aggressive MNCs, using for this purpose the 
ROC curve analysis. As registered in appendix 4, the area under the curve (AUC = 0,775) 
is considerable above the reference value of 0.5 (p < 0.01), which represents a significant 
capacity of the logistic regression model to discriminate firms with aggressive transfer 
pricing behaviors from those with no aggressive transfer pricing practices. 
  
                                                 
13
 DX2 represents the Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) information about the influente observations in the 
model in function of the estimated probabilities given by ∆X 2J. 
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5.5 Additional analysis  
In order to assess consistency on the dependent variable, the study considered the inclusion 
of alternative aggressive tax measures existent in the literature (Dyreng et al., 2008; 
Manzon and Plesko, 2002; Shevlin, 2010; and Lisowsky et al., 2013.,) denoted by ETRs, 
such as, the cash effective tax rate (CASHETR), the accounting effective tax rate 
(ACCETR), as well as, the book tax gap (BTGETR) from Manzon and Plesko, 2002. In fact, 
Dharmapala (2008) and Desai and Hines (2002) make reference for the intensity to which 
MNCs increase their international tax avoidance through transfer pricing activities. 
Moreover, very frequently these intragroup transactions take the form of financing schemes 
settled between MNCs treasury centers and its controlled subsidiaries where the main 
purpose is to explore, for instance, derivatives taxation inconsistency across jurisdictions 
since different tax treatments is a common practice. By having this into context I have 
extent the empirical analysis by considering relevant tax avoidance measures in the present 
literature denoted as follows: 
(2) ACCETR: a dummy variable coded as 1 if the income tax expense registered (current 
and deferred taxes) divided by the pretax accounting income indicates a tax value below its 
market reference, and 0 otherwise; 
(3) CASHETR: a dummy variable coded as 1 if the cash tax paid divided by the pretax 
accounting income is below to its reference and 0 otherwise; 
(4) BTGETR: a dummy variable coded as 1 if the pretax accounting income less taxable 
income, divided by the total assets indicates a tax difference below to its reference, and 0 
otherwise. 
All three MNCs effective tax rates measures are classified as a dummy variable, which 
takes into consideration a benchmarking reference. Thus, MNCs presenting effective tax 
rates below the eligible reference are classified as aggressive tax players. The base logistic 
regression for the model is designed to include all three ETR’s, separately, and is estimated 
as follows: 
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ETR’s it = αit + β1 IRit + β2 FERit + β3 MULTIit + β4 PROFITit + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 CFOAit 
+ β8 INDSit + β9 YEARit + εit                                                                                          (5.2; 5.3; or 5.4, respectively) 
Table 9 presents the additional regression X
2
Wald coefficient results. In general I found 
consistency and evidence amongst the tax avoidance ETR’s (ACCETR, CASHETR and 
BTGETR) and the transfer pricing aggressive measure as presented in model one (1). By 
considering the ACCETR, the relevant conclusion to be made against the results obtained 
from table 8 concerns the MULTI variable, which shows a positive and significant 
coefficient (X
2
Wald = 3,316; p = 0,069) at 10% level. Additionally, I found the IR 
coefficient (X
2
Wald = 3,038; p = 0,081) and FER coefficient (X
2
Wald = 12,147; p = 0,000) 
to have a significant association to ACCETR at 10% and 1% levels, respectively, which 
denotes reliability and robustness for the result obtained in model (1). Similar conclusions 
applied to LEV coefficient (X
2
Wald = 15,002; p = 0,000) and PROFIT coefficient 
(X
2
Wald = 15,226; p = 0,000). 
Regarding the CASHETR, the results presented less significant coefficients for the 
generality of the variables, however, the IR, FER and LEV variables, (X
2
Wald = 3,514; 
p = 0,061),  (X
2
Wald = 8,977; p = 0,003) and (X2Wald = 3,954; p = 0,047) respectively, 
remain a significant tendency association between tax aggressiveness/avoidance behaviors, 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates and high leveraged MNCs..  
Finally, the BTETR measure reinforces the significance association registered between tax 
avoidance and the IR variable (X
2
Wald = 2,933; p = 0,087) at 10% level. Additionally it 
brings evidence that sizable, i.e., SIZE (X
2
Wald = 8,212; p = 0,004), MNCs are has 
significant influence on tax aggressiveness/avoidance behaviors since their robust structure 
is more capable to raise capital at lower costs and distribute across related parties in 
favorable circumstances.     
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Table 9 - Logistic regression results – ETR’s 
  
ACCETR (LOGIT) CASHETR (LOGIT) BTETR (LOGIT) 
X
2 
Wald X
2 
Wald X
2 
Wald 
IR 3,038* 3,514* 2,933* 
FER 12,147*** 8,977*** 0,469 
MULTI 3,316* 0,081 1,697 
LEV 15,002*** 3,954** 9,539*** 
PROFIT 15,266*** 0,527 1,925 
CFOA 1,214 0,016 0,135 
SIZE 0,773 0,041 8,212*** 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes 
INDUS Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5,085 3,153 12,850 
Pseudo R
2
 
McFadden  
0,078 0,019 0,061 
N 1053 
ETR’s variables definition: ACCETR is defined as the income tax expense (current and deferred taxes) 
divided by the pretax accounting income. CASHETR is measured by the cash tax paid divided by the pretax 
accounting income. BTETR is calculated as a pretax accounting income less taxable income, divided by the 
total assets. 
*** indicates significance at the 0,01 level, ** indicates significance at  0,05 level and * indicates 
significance at the 0,10 level;  
The p-values are 2-tailed, once it aims to test for the possibility of the relationship in both directions. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The present study identifies the influence of derivatives instruments on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness behaviors of public listed multinational firms in the U.K. In line with 
relevant literature, I found empirical evidence on derivative instruments practices to be 
significantly associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness, contributing this way for one 
of the leading source of corporate tax noncompliance. By this means, having the previous 
results into context, is appropriate to certify the TPAGG proxy contribution for future 
research projects, since it revealed significance and reliance on the logistic regression of 
derivatives instruments on transfer pricing aggressiveness. Moreover, additional 
contribution is given by including important practices and methodologies as suggested in 
BEPS action plans. 
Despite the reliable results achieved in regression model one (4.1), consistent with the 
additional analysis models (5.2, 5.3 and 5.4), the study is subject to several limitations such 
as, (i) the sample considers only publicly listed MNCs in the UK since data for private 
MNCs are not available for consultation, (ii) the transfer pricing aggressiveness variable 
takes into account aggregated financial information at the group level, not individually by 
treasury center, (iii) an MNCs decision to use derivatives is, in the majority, defined by 
unobservable factors, so further approaches should be considered in order to mitigate 
potential concerns, e.g., document whether tax savings increases with aggressive transfer 
pricing behaviors. 
In the future, transfer pricing aggressiveness researches could take into consideration 
different aspects, capable to contribute for the extent and sophistication of the theme. For 
instance, (i) explore how the different accounting treatment on derivatives across countries 
influence the MNCs tax behaviors on financing subsidiaries, (ii) measure the impact of the 
recent transfer pricing BEPS initiatives on countries (OECD and non-OECD) tax 
compliance and governance, and (iii) extent literature on corporate tax avoidance and 
financial instruments, other than derivatives, such as, special purpose vehicles and hybrid 
mismatch arrangements on intragroup financing.     
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Appendix 1 - Diagram for studentized residuals 
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 Appendix 2 - Analog of Cook’s influence statistics 
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Appendix 3 - Efficiency classification table 
 
 
  
 38 
 
 
Appendix 4 - ROC curve analysis 
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